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On July 8, 2016, the South Korean government announced its decision to deploy the first 
stages of the U.S.-operated Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) technology in South 
Korea. Both countries stated that the reason for deployment was to enhance the security of South 
Korea, the U.S. and their allies in the Asia Pacific region against North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
provocations. However, a closer look at the timing and events surrounding the deployment poses 
significant questions over the South Korean government’s decision to deploy a highly 
controversial and expensive U.S.-operated military technology that had little military and strategic 
benefit to South Korea. This thesis seeks to understand the factors that ultimately led the South 
Korean government to deploy the first stages of THAAD and its subsequent decision to impede 
the deployment of additional stages. The analysis demonstrates that the South Korean 
government’s decision to deploy THAAD under the Park administration was primarily based on 
the importance it placed on maintaining the military and strategic alliance with the U.S., thereby 
using the deployment of the first stages of THAAD in July 2016 as a temporary appeasement 
measure to repair its relations with the U.S. The decision closely tracked the changes in direct or 
 v  
indirect U.S. pressure to adopt an integrated defensive system to counteract threats by North Korea 
rather than any significant change in patterns of North Korean nuclear and missile provocation. 
Such observations were also strongly supported by the lack of significant military or strategic 
benefit of THAAD to enhance South Korean security against North Korea’s threats. Once the 
initial stages were deployed, U.S.-South Korea relations improved and the urgency of repairing 
the alliance subsided, which led the Moon administration to suspend any additional stages of 
deployment in an effort to minimize further economic repercussions from China, exacerbated 
security dilemma with North Korea and domestic turmoil and public mistrust. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research Question 
On July 8, 2016, the South Korean government announced its decision to deploy the first 
stages of THAAD technology in South Korea. Both countries stated that the primary reason for 
deployment was to enhance the security of South Korea, the U.S. and allies in the Asia Pacific 
region against North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations.1 As expected, China and North 
Korea vigorously opposed the deployment. In particular, China has specifically alleged that 
THAAD’s radar system undermines its strategic security interests by expanding U.S. surveillance 
into mainland China and has threatened to use economic retaliation against South Korea unless it 
ceased the deployment. Adding to the controversy, military and technological evidence indicated 
that THAAD was largely ineffective in countering short-range missiles used by North Korea to 
attack the South, which questioned the entire basis under which the South Korean government 
decided to deploy THAAD. After deploying the first stages of THAAD under President Park, her 
successor, President Moon, suspended additional deployment in June 2017 pending further 
verification. 
This thesis seeks to understand the factors that ultimately led the South Korean government 
to deploy the first stages of THAAD and its subsequent decision to impede the deployment of 
additional stages at the time and in the manner that it did. The analysis demonstrates that the South 
Korean government’s decision to deploy THAAD under the Park administration was primarily 
based on the importance it placed on maintaining the military and strategic alliance with the U.S., 
                                                   
1 Tim Beal, “The Deployment of THAAD in Korea and the Struggle over US Global Hegemony,” Journal of 
Political Criticism 19, (2016): 20. 
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thereby using the deployment of the first stages of THAAD in July 2016 as a temporary 
appeasement measure to repair its relations with the U.S. The decision closely tracked the changes 
in direct or indirect U.S. pressure to adopt an integrated defensive system to counteract threats by 
North Korea rather than any significant change in patterns of North Korean nuclear and missile 
provocation. Such observations were also strongly supported by the lack of significant military or 
strategic benefit of THAAD to enhance South Korean security against North Korea’s threats. Once 
the initial stages were deployed, U.S.-South Korea relations improved and the urgency of repairing 
the alliance subsided, which led the Moon administration to suspend any additional stages of 
deployment in June 2017 in an effort to minimize further economic repercussions from China, 
exacerbated security dilemma with North Korea and domestic turmoil and public mistrust. 
The first chapter examines whether there was a significant change in North Korea’s pattern 
of nuclear and missile provocations in the timeframe leading up to the July 2016 decision to deploy 
THAAD when compared to previous pattern of provocations. The analysis demonstrates that while 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile technological capabilities have steadily increased, most 
prominently after Chairman Kim Jong-un rose to power in 2011, a time-series analysis of North 
Korea’s pattern of nuclear and missile provocations demonstrates that there were no significant 
changes leading up to July 2016 when compared to previous years of significant nuclear and 
missile provocations by North Korea. In addition, an analysis of the military and technical 
capabilities of THAAD and the site and manner of its deployment also strongly indicate that the 
deployment of THAAD had no real military or strategic benefit in protecting South Korea against 
North Korean nuclear and military threats. Further, the deployment drew vigorous opposition from 
China, which alleged that THAAD’s radar capabilities to monitor China would undermine its 
strategic security interests, escalate military confrontations and trigger a regional arms race, and 
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has pursued significant economic retaliation against South Korea to cease the deployment.  Thus, 
the lack of significant changes in North Korea’s pattern of nuclear and missile provocations, 
coupled with weak evidence of THAAD’s military and security benefits to South Korea 
demonstrate that North Korea’s pattern of nuclear and missile provocations was not the primary 
factor that influenced the South Korean government’s decision to deploy THAAD. Rather, it was 
the South Korean government’s focus on maintaining the military and strategic alliance with the 
U.S., despite weak evidence of THAAD’s benefits to enhance South Korean security and drawing 
economic retaliation from China.  
The second chapter examines whether any changes in direct or indirect U.S. pressures to 
adopt an integrated ballistic missile defense (BMD) system has led to the South Korean 
government’s decision to deploy THAAD. Such pressures can take the form of direct pressure to 
adopt an expensive technological defense system or indirect pressure involving the scaling down 
of various U.S. commitments, such as decreased joint military drills/exercises, reduced number of 
U.S. troops stationed in South Korean bases and decreased financial contributions for joint military 
purposes. The analysis demonstrates that South Korea has faced consistent U.S. pressure to adopt 
an integrated BMD architecture and threats to decrease U.S. military and financial commitments, 
but has struggled between maintaining the alliance versus resisting such pressures in order to 
preserve its military and strategic autonomy. The U.S.’s actions to scale down various military 
commitments and financial contribution for maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea have been 
consistently present, with increasing pressure on South Korea to be responsible for a greater share 
of financial costs, a burden that has already been disproportionately skewed against South Korea. 
The South Korean government’s response to consistent U.S. pressure closely aligns with its 
decision to deploy the first stages of THAAD – both decisions that are based on the importance it 
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places on maintain the military and strategic alliance with the U.S. Such observations have been 
especially apparent after another failed attempt to transfer wartime operational control from the 
U.S. to South Korea, which increased the stakes for South Korea to repair its relations with the 
U.S. by deploying the first stages of THAAD as an appeasement measure. 
The last chapter analyzes the effects of domestic public opinion on the South Korean 
government’s decision to deploy THAAD and the international and domestic political context, 
policy priorities and strategic outlook that significantly influenced President Park’s decision to 
deploy the first stages of THAAD and President Moon’s decision to impede the continued 
deployment of additional stages. The analysis demonstrates that the already significant public 
mistrust of the government and unprecedented public criticism of the opaque and undemocratic 
manner in which the Park administration handled the negotiations leading up to deployment did 
not deter the South Korean government’s decision to deploy THAAD. Again, the South Korean 
government’s emphasis on preserving and maintaining the military and strategic alliance with the 
U.S. above all costs has strongly influenced its decision to deploy despite strong opposition from 
the public, which ultimately contributed to President Park’s impeachment. Only after the first stage 
of THAAD was deployed and U.S.-South Korea relations improved did the Moon administration 
suspend any additional stages of deployment, citing the need to reinstitute truly democratic politics 
and transcendent policy-making in an effort to alleviate further domestic turmoil and public 
mistrust.  
Current Literature 
The current literature on THAAD narrowly focuses on the policy recommendations or 
implications of THAAD as a new defense technology and how it affects military and security 
considerations, economic trade levels and civil society. Lee and Botto argue that the expedited 
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deployment of THAAD during a period of unprecedented political turmoil in South Korea has 
contributed to the rise of anti-imperialist voices that play major roles in framing the public debate 
over a range of security issues, thereby focusing on how the deployment of THAAD  has 
contributed to criticism against U.S. military’s wartime operational control of the South Korean 
military and South Korea’s dependence on U.S. defense capabilities, which have spurred calls to 
re-evaluate what many perceive as a costly and restrictive alliance structure.2 Similarly, Kim and 
Park emphasize the need to focus on the consequences of THAAD on the dynamics of security 
dilemma and that the focal point of debate should be evaluating the military capability, 
effectiveness, availability and costs of THAAD and its implications for South Korean security. 
Further, Ross also focuses on the deployment of THAAD as a political instrument that would serve 
as a litmus test whether South Korea would be compelled to recommit to the U.S.-South Korea 
alliance.3 
This focus on the implications of THAAD has moved the discourse away from analyzing 
the decision-making calculus of states and factors that ultimately led to the decision to deploy, as 
well as how and why THAAD was deployed in the timing and manner that it did. In my thesis, I 
plan to examine the events surrounding the deployment of THAAD to better understand the 
shifting decision-making calculus of multiple international players, including the U.S., China and 
South Korea, as well as other factors, such as the changing nature of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, 
North Korean provocations and U.S. pressures to adopt an integrated defense system and withdraw 
commitments and its impact on the decision to the deploy. 
                                                   
2 Chung Min Lee and Kathryn Botto, “President Moon Jae-in and the Politics of Inter-Korean Détente,” Carnegie  
Endowment for International Peace, Korea Strategic Review 2018, 39. 
3 Chuyi Sheng, “Robert Ross behind the THAAD controversy: analysis of a veteran China watcher,” Claremont  
McKenna College Asia Experts Forum, May 6, 2017, http://asiaexpertsforum.org/robert-ross-behind-thaad- 
controversy-analysis-veteran-china-watcher/. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PATTERN OF NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATIONS AND  
IMPACT ON THE DECISION TO DEPLOY 
Both South Korea and the U.S. have insisted that its primary reason for deploying THAAD 
in South Korea was to enhance the security of South Korea and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), or the 
U.S. military presence in South Korea, against North Korea’s increasing nuclear and missile 
threats, citing enhanced capabilities of North Korea’s nuclear and missile technology and 
allegations of increasing frequency and magnitude of provocations. Given such rationale, an 
analysis is necessary to understand whether there has been any change in the pattern of North 
Korean nuclear and missile provocations leading up to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. 
This chapter demonstrates that based on a time-series comparison of the frequency and magnitude 
of North Korean provocations between 2000 to 2017, there has been no significant change in the 
pattern of North Korean nuclear and missile provocations. The analysis weakens the rationale that 
the South Korean government’s decision to deploy THAAD in July 2016 was primarily in response 
to mitigate the effects of North Korea’s increasing nuclear and missile threats. 
North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Program 
While North Korea’s nuclear and missile technological capabilities have recently 
improved, a time-series analysis of North Korea’s pattern of nuclear and missile provocations 
demonstrates that there were no significant changes in the frequency or magnitude of North Korean 
threats in the timeframe leading up to July 2016 when compared to previous years of nuclear and 
missile provocations by North Korea. North Korea first established, with Soviet support, a nuclear 
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research center in 1962 and had managed to produce a small amount of plutonium by 1975.4 Since 
then, North Korea has advanced its nuclear and missile programs, most notably under the current 
leader Kim Jong Un. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993 
after failing to satisfy inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Association to verify 
denuclearization and continued its uranium enrichment program. Relations with the U.S. have not 
significantly recovered since President Bush branded North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” in 
his 2002 State of the Union address.5 North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 
and the UN Security Council subsequently passed a series of nine sanctions resolutions against 
North Korea that continue to this day.6 Largely as an effort by China to use engagement as a 
strategy to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, the Six-Party Talks between 2003 and 
2009 – in which North and South Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan participated – is often 
identified as the most sustained multilateral effort towards North Korea’s denuclearization and 
addressing North Korea’s security concerns. Despite significant steps to disable its nuclear 
facilities in exchange for economic aid and lifting of sanctions, negotiations broke down with 
North Korea due to discrepancies in verification procedures and resistance in cooperation. North 
Korea conducted its second nuclear test in 2009, which effectively ended the Six-Party Talks. In 
2010, the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan near the North and South’s maritime 
border, which international agencies largely concluded was sunk by a North Korean torpedo, and 
the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by a North Korean artillery placed South Korea’s military on 
                                                   
4 Institute for Security & Development Policy, “Negotiating North Korea’s Nukes,” Institute for Security 
 & Development Policy, (2019): 1.  
5 Ibid., 6. 
6 Ibid., 2. 
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its highest non-wartime alert and prompted the U.S. to rule out any possibility of resuming the Six-
Party Talks.7  
After his father’s death in 2011, Kim Jong Un succeeded as North Korea’s leader and 
significantly sped up North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Figure 1 shows the progress that North 
Korea has achieved in enhancing its missile program under Kim Jong Un compared to its two 
previous leaders.8 
 
Figure 1. North Korea Missile Launches Source: Missile Defense Project. “Missiles of North Korea,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic & International 
Studies. 
 
                                                   
7 Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control  
Association, April, 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 
8 Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of North Korea,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic & International Studies,  
June 14, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/. 
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In February 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, which was followed by two 
more nuclear tests in 2016.9 Similarly, it accelerated its development of missile technology – it 
conducted 2 tests in 2012, which was significantly increased to 24 tests in 2016 and 20 tests in 
2017.10 During this period, relations with the U.S. and South Korea continued to be irreparable. 
No high-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea took place between 2012 and 2017 and the 
conservative administrations of President Lee Myung-bak and President Park Geun-hye refused to 
engage with North Korea unless it took steps to denuclearize.  
Lack of Significant Change in North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Provocations 
When compared to 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2010 – years in which there has been significant 
nuclear and missile provocations by North Korea – the period leading up to deployment in July 
2016 saw a similar pattern of North Korean aggression but cannot be viewed as a period having 
an abrupt and unusual escalation in the conflict between North Korea and South Korea. Further, 
this period did not see a significantly heightened progress in North Korea’s nuclear or missile 
technology that had materially changed the existing strategic environment or shifted the conflict 
management process. In particular, an analysis of the pattern of North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
tests and provocations during the period leading up to July 2016 and during the initial stages of 
deployment in 2017 demonstrates no clear relationship or correlation between the deployment of 
THAAD and North Korea’s ballistic missile tests.  
                                                   
9 Institute for Security & Development Policy, “Negotiating North Korea’s Nukes,” 4. 
10 Ibid. 
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Figure 2. North Korea Ballistic Missile Test Launches, 2016-2019 
Source: Dempsey. “North Korean missiles: all fired up again?,” International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates that there were four missile tests conducted in July 2016, which was 
the same in March and April of 2016 and not particularly unusual when considering the pattern of 
missile tests in 2016.11 There was an actual decrease in missile tests in May and June 2016 leading 
up to the announcement to deploy, as well as a decrease in the months following the announcement. 
In March 2017, when the first elements of THAAD arrived in South Korea and were installed, 
North Korean missile tests increased to 5 events, but the pattern of tests throughout the rest of 2017 
was similar to 2016. Notably, North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testings in 
July and November of 2017 bear no relation to the schedule of THAAD deployment, which 
President Moon suspended in June 2017 pending further verification. Thus, an analysis of the 
pattern of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests during the period leading up to and during the 
deployment of THAAD demonstrates that there was no significant change to North Korea’s pattern 
of nuclear and missile threats, thereby weakening the argument that the deployment of THAAD in 
July 2016 was primarily to defend against North Korea’s increasing provocations and nuclear and 
missile threats directed towards South Korea and the U.S.  
                                                   
11 Joseph Dempsey, “North Korean missiles: all fired up again?,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 
30, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/05/north-korean-missiles. 
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Analysis of THAAD’s Perceived Benefits (or Lack Thereof) to South Korean Security 
Given the lack of change in patterns of North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations in 
the period leading up to the deployment of THAAD, the question remains whether THAAD was 
deployed as a general defensive measure in response to decades of continuous North Korean 
provocations and steadily advancing capabilities and if so, whether the evidence or perceived 
benefits of THAAD to South Korean security was significant enough to warrant the costs of 
deployment. An analysis of the military and technological capabilities of THAAD, when viewed 
in light of North Korea’s previous patterns of missile and nuclear capabilities and provocations 
against South Korea, further weaken the argument that the deployment of THAAD was 
technologically necessary or justifies its costs when compared to its benefits to South Korea’s 
security. 
Technical Capabilities of THAAD 
THAAD is a transportable missile defense system technology, operated by the U.S., 
designed to intercept medium and long-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase, which uses 
a hit-to-kill interceptor to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction 
before they reach the ground and result in severe casualties.12 It was first developed after the 
Persian Gulf War in the 1990s in response to Iraq’s Scud missile attacks.13 The official program 
was chartered by the U.S. in 1992 and reached program initiation status in 2000.14 The first 
deployment of THAAD in the U.S. occurred in 2008 and since then has been deployed in Guam, 
                                                   
12 Institute for Security & Development Policy, “THAAD on the Korean Peninsula,” Institute for Security & 
Development Policy, (2017): 2.  
13 Robert M. Stein and Theodore A. Postol, “Patriot Experience in the Gulf War,” International Security 17, no. 1  
(1992): 204-05. 
14 Missile Defense Project, "Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic  
and International Studies, June 14, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/thaad/. 
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South Korea, and several other countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Israel and Romania. 
THAAD is known to be able to intercept incoming missiles both inside and outside of the Earth’s 
atmosphere at a range of 200 kilometers. The ability to intercept both inside and outside the 
atmosphere makes THAAD an important part of layered missile defense, as it cover the range of 
the exclusively exo-atmospheric Aegis interceptors and the exclusively endo-atmospheric Patriot 
interceptors and anything in between. There are four main components to THAAD: the launcher, 
interceptors, radar, and fire control. The launcher is mounted on a truck for mobility and storage 
with eight interceptors per launcher. Current U.S. Army configurations of THAAD batteries 
include six launchers and 48 interceptors and can be scaled up to nine launchers and 72 
interceptors.15 The Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) radar is capable of 
detecting and tracking missiles at a range of up to 1,000 kilometers. The fire control system is the 
communication and data-management backbone of the THAAD system, which is integrated with 
other Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications technology to provide 
tracking and cueing information for THAAD from other regional sensors on Aegis and Patriot 
systems.16 Official reports and test records from the U.S. Missile Defense Agency demonstrates 
that THAAD has been successful in all 16 out of 16 test intercepts.17 Such reports seemed to 
indicate that if THAAD was successfully deployed in South Korea, it had the potential to impact 
North Korea’s security and strategic calculus for nuclear and missile proliferation and possibly 
impact the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region between the two hegemons – the U.S. and 
China.  
                                                   
15 Ibid. 
16 “Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) FY19 Ballistic Missile Defense Systems,” The office of the  
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, January 30, 2020, 219-20.  
17 “Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record,” Missile Defense Agency, (2019): 1-2.  
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Perceived Benefits of THAAD to South Korean Security 
In 1994, the U.S. deployed its first Patriot missile defense systems in response to North 
Korea’s first nuclear test. The Patriot system was an appropriate defensive measure at the time 
because most North Korean missiles in the 1990s were Scud or shorter-range missiles that the 
Patriot interceptors could successfully intercept.18 Since then, North Korea has developed the 
capability to deploy NoDong and Musudan medium- and intermediate-range missiles that require 
a defense system, such as THAAD, that is able to handle higher missile re-entry speeds.19 Further, 
the layered approach that THAAD provides to intercept missiles both inside and outside the 
atmosphere is thought to significantly enhance the existing missile defense framework in South 
Korea.20  
Table 1. North Korean Missile Specifications 
 
Source: Sankaran and Fearey. “Missile defense and strategic stability: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) in South Korea,” Contemporary Security Policy in Asian Security. Data from Cordesman and Linn (2015, 
p. 184, 187); International Crisis Group (2009); Ministry of Unification (2014, p. 193); Ministry of Defense (2015, p. 
20–22); Ministry of National Defense (2014, p. 32); National Air and Space Intelligence Center (2013); Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (2013, p. 19). 
 
                                                   
18 Bruce W. Bennet, “Why THAAD Is Needed in Korea,” RAND Corporation, August 7, 2017,  
https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/08/why-thaad-is-needed-in-korea.html. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Missile Defense Project, "Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)," 
https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/thaad/. 
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Table 1 and figure 3 demonstrate the different types of missiles that North Korea currently 
possesses.21 North Korea’s short- and medium-range missiles include a host of artillery and short-
range rockets, including its legacy Scud-based and No-Dong missiles as well as new short-range 
missiles such as the KN-23 and KN-25, which were tested in 2019.22  North Korea has also 
improved its long-range missile technology. More concerning to the U.S., North Korea had 
successfully launched its first ICBM, the Hwasong-14, in July 2017 and a heavier ICBM, 
Hwasong-15, in November 2017.23  
 
Figure 3. North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles Source:	Missile Defense Project. “Missiles of North Korea,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic & International 
Studies. 
 
                                                   
21 Jaganath Sankaran and Bryan Leo Fearey, “Missile defense and strategic stability: Terminal High Altitude Area  
Defense (THAAD) in South Korea,” Contemporary Security Policy in Asian Security, (2017): 6; Missile Defense  
Project, “Missiles of North Korea,” https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/. 
22 Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of North Korea,” https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/. 
23 Ibid. 
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North Korea’s use of longer-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons threatened 
to reach targets in Guam, Japan, Russia and China, which further accelerated the U.S.’s strategy 
to deploy THAAD in key regions of interest. In 2013, the U.S. deployed its first THAAD unit 
overseas in Guam to protect major U.S. military facilities in the region against North Korea’s 
missile threat.24 The obvious preferred site for a second deployment was in South Korea, where 
the U.S. has maintained a long-standing military and security alliance and had the best chances of 
successfully detecting and intercepting an intercontinental ballistic missile launched from North 
Korea against the U.S. when compared to other sites such as Guam, Japan or Australia, which 
were further away from the site of launch.25 The deployment in Seongju is estimated to cover most 
of the USFK base in South Korea, which includes the U.S. bases at Camp Humphreys at 
Pyeongtaek, Osan Air Base at Songtan, Kunsan Air Base at Kunsan and Camp Walker at Daegu, 
and the South Korean civilians who reside in the region within its coverage.26  While the initial 
limited THAAD deployment of only two launchers with a total of 16 interceptions would have 
forced to choose which cities to protect in the event of an attack, the additional four THAAD 
launchers that were later accepted by the South Korean government allows an even greater area to 
be covered. 27  The U.S. is not the only state that has been accelerating adoption of a more 
formidable missile defense system. Recently, China has also reportedly deployed an S-400 missile 
defense system, which is similar to THAAD, on the Shandong Peninsula, between Pyongyang and 
Beijing. Based on the location of deployment, it appears that China is also concerned about 
                                                   
24 Missile Defense Project, "Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),”  
https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/thaad/. 
25 Bennet, “Why THAAD Is Needed in Korea,” https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/08/why-thaad-is-needed-in-
korea.html. 
26 “THAAD covers most major military bases but leaves out Seoul,” The Straits Times, April 27, 2017,  
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/thaad-covers-most-major-military-bases-but-leaves-out-seoul. 
27 Ibid. 
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defending itself against a surprise North Korean missile attack.28  
Ineffective to Counter Missile Threats Directed Against South Korea  
Despite the increasing adoption of high-tech missile defense systems by the U.S. and China 
in recent years, the actual effectiveness of THAAD’s capabilities to successfully intercept 
intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles is widely debated. According to statistics 
reported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. has had a 100% 
success rate for 15 interception tests conducted since 2006.29 However, several non-U.S. missile 
defense and monitoring agencies report statistics that are much lower and closer to 50%, including 
a recent interception failure in Hawaii in 2017.30 Even if THAAD was effective, to a certain extent, 
in intercepting intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, evidence demonstrates 
that THAAD was largely ineffective to counter short-range missiles that are likely more used in 
an event North Korea attacks the South. 
Moreover, many missile defense experts, on both pro- and anti-THAAD spectrums, have 
expressed serious doubts that THAAD would be effective in preventing North Korean missile 
attacks against South Korea. Technical specifications demonstrate that THAAD is only capable of 
intercepting high-altitude missiles characteristic of long-range missiles, which North Korea would 
unlikely use against its immediate neighbor.31 In addition, a layered defense consisting of adding 
the THAAD system to South Korea’s currently existing Patriot system may not be able to 
completely block a missile attack by North Korea unless the appropriately deployed by taking into 
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account the overlapping coverage area, which could cause significant casualties as well as damage 
in South Korea.”32 Further, THAAD’s system is not design to intercept a large number of missiles 
that are simultaneously fired, which will likely barrage or overload THAAD’s detection system 
and penetrate its defenses, a tactic that North Korea is capable of pursuing against South Korea 
with its large number of short- and medium-range missiles.”33 Indeed, to the extent that it works 
at all, it is easily overwhelmed by firing multiple missiles, some of which can be equipped with 
simple decoys to defeat THAAD’s radar that would evade its limited search angle of about 108°, 
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which would render THAAD useless.34 
While North Korea has an ambitious missile development program, its various missile 
capabilities are not equal. Its ability to successfully use an intermediate range (range from 1000 to 
5500km) or an intercontinental ballistic missiles (range greater than 5500 km) is questionable and 
largely debated.35 However, North Korea’s shorter range missiles, including various types of 
Scuds and some Nodong missiles, are more tested and presumed to have a higher likelihood of 
operational effectiveness.  THAAD is designed to intercept an incoming missile at an altitude of 
40km to 150km, which makes it fit for intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missiles.36 North 
Korea’s shorter range missiles will have to fly much lower to strike the South, and would render 
THAAD ineffective. Also, a single THAAD unit is likely to be somewhat effective in defeating a 
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barrage of a small number of missiles, and to provide an early warning system to give U.S.-South 
Korean forces sufficient time to respond. However, North Korea is believed to possess 250-300 
Nodong missiles that can be launched in a short window, which, if launched in that manner, would 
defeat the purpose of what THAAD is designed to thwart.  
 
 
Figure 4. North Korea Nuclear Facilities 
Source: “North Korea fires missile over Japan triggering warnings,” Deutsche Welle. Data from Arms Control  
Association; U.S.-Korea Institute (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. 
 
 
Geographic considerations and the particular site of deployment, Seongju, also strengthens 
the argument that the primary object to deploy THAAD was not to enhance South Korea’s security 
against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. The deployment site is in a remote village within 
Seongju in South Korea that is over 250 km south of Seoul, the South Korean capital.37 THAAD’s 
coverage area is estimated to be at most altitudes of 40-150 km and ranges up to 200 km.38 Figure 
4 shows a map of North Korea’s facilities where its nuclear, missile, biological and chemical 
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programs are located.39 Most of its nuclear facilities are concentrated in Yongbyon County, which 
contains nuclear facilities used for both civilian and military purposes. North Korea maintains a 
testing facility at Punggye-ri, where it tested nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, and 2013.40 However, 
the distance between the Yongbyon Nuclear Science and Weapons Research Center41 to Seoul is 
270 km and the distance between Punggye-ri to Seoul is 439 km, which means that based on its 
technological specifications, THAAD, as deployed in its current location in Seongju, cannot 
intercept North Korea’s missiles directed at Seoul. 
The U.S. and South Korean officials have both confirmed that THAAD’s radius of 
protection will not extent to Seoul, located just thirty miles from the North Korean border, or the 
northern regions of South Korea that is closest to the border. A former high-ranking South Korean 
military officer, speaking under condition of anonymity, made it clear that the decision to deploy 
THAAD was not to protect Seoul in case of a nuclear or missile attack by North Korea. He stated 
that “During a possible war with North Korea, places like Yongsan, where South Korea’s Defense 
Ministry and USFK headquarters are located, would be North Korea’s primary target for strikes. 
Once chances of war are certain, Seoul will be evacuated. So strategically speaking, there would 
not be many major assets left in Seoul to be struck by North Korean weapon systems.”42 Thus, the 
current geospatial positioning of THAAD will continue to leave Seoul, South Korea’s most 
populous region where 26 million people reside, continuously vulnerable to North Korea’s missile 
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attacks.43 Rather, the system seems to have been strategically placed to protect the area where U.S. 
bases in South Korea are most heavily concentrated, as well as U.S. forces in Japan and the rest of 
Asia-Pacific.44 The lack of protection for the bulk of South Korea’s population sends the signal 
that THAAD was primarily deployed to protect U.S. offensive military capabilities in South Korea 
and in the Asia-Pacific and to use its early missile warning system that can detect North Korean, 
Chinese and Russian long-range missiles against the U.S. (to be discussed below), but with no real 
military or strategic benefit to South Korea.  
China’s Reactions to South Korea’s Decision to Deploy THAAD 
China and North Korea has vigorously opposed THAAD’s deployment in South Korea for 
years. In particular, China has alleged that the primary reason for the U.S. deploying THAAD in 
South Korea was not to defend South Korea from North Korea’s attacks but to serve the larger 
purpose of using THAAD’s radar capabilities to monitor China and undermine the strategic 
security interests of related states which will “impede the nuclear disarmament process, trigger a 
regional arms race and escalate military confrontation.”45  China has also pursued economic 
retaliations to pressure South Korea to cease deployment of THAAD. The economic impact has 
been significant, considering that China is South Korea’s largest trading partner by a wide margin, 
which constitutes more than two times the trade volume between South Korea and the U.S.,46 and 
inbound foreign direct investment and trade from China to South Korea forms a significant part of 
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South Korea’s economy, especially in heavily dependent export-driven sectors such as 
entertainment, cosmetics, automobiles, electronics and tourism. Given the expected reactions from 
China and the significant costs of economic retaliation, an analysis of the South Korean 
government’s decision-making framework and the emphasis it placed on preserving the U.S.-
South Korea military and security alliance helps understand the reason it decided to pursue the 
deployment in the face of near certain economic retaliation from China. 
THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 Radar System and Monitoring of China’s Activities 
China’s vigorous opposition to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea is centered on 
THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar system, which allegedly expands U.S. surveillance into mainland 
China, and to a lesser extent, Russia, to allow monitoring of China’s military activities and thereby 
undermine its strategic security interests. China argues that THAAD’s radar system may reduce if 
not neutralize China’s ability to respond immediately to an external attack and diminish its 
strategic deterrence, which makes THAAD a security threat and its deployment a destabilizing 
move.47 Theoretically, the early warning relayed to the ballistic missile defense system in Alaska 
can deprive China of its second strike capability by destroying Chinese missiles mid-air before 
reaching its intended targets in the U.S. and allow the U.S. the possibility to strike China first 
without worrying about retaliation from Chinese ICBMs.48 The placement of a THAAD radar in 
South Korea has the unambiguous technical appearance of placing it in a location where it can 
provide tracking information on Chinese ICBMs before they rise over the curved earth-horizon 
and can be seen by the main ground-based missile defense systems and radars of the U.S. National 
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Missile Defense in Alaska, which can provide an additional early detection system for the U.S.49  
Figure 5 shows that the trajectory for an ICBM launched against the U.S. would follow a circular 
path that goes through Alaska, making Fort Greely the ideal location for an anti-ballistic missile 
system.50 An AN/TPY-2 radar in South Korea can detect an ICBM launch and relay its trajectory 
to the ground-based missile defense system in Fort Greely.  
 
 
Figure 5. Trajectory of North Korea IBCM and Range of THAAD’s Radar 
Source: Park. “With THAAD, S. Korea would be pulled into US-China power play,” Hankyoreh. Data from 
Postol and Lewis. 
 
 
China believes that while perhaps THAAD may provide some limited defense against 
North Korean ballistic missiles, it is primarily intended to serve the much larger purpose of 
weakening China’s strategic deterrence while contributing to a global anti-missile system that 
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threatens both China and Russia. The decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea exacerbates a 
strong sense of Chinese resentment against alleged efforts by the U.S. to extract sensitive military 
information about China from neighboring allies in order to degrade China’s security and also 
exacerbate China’s concern of containment or encirclement by the U.S. and its allies.51  
Chinese policymakers therefore believe that THAAD represents a security threat to their 
strategic capabilities and compromises their territorial sovereignty. The exact technical capabilities 
of THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar and how deep it can look into the Chinese mainland are highly 
debated. According to most estimates, THAAD’s radar has a range up to approximately 2,000 
kilometers, which reaches most of the eastern half of China from the deployment site.52 Figure 6 
shows that China’s main nuclear and missile facilities are located the eastern half of China.53 For 
instance, the distance from China’s Academy of Engineering Physics to Seongju is over 2,200 
kilometers. While some Chinese scholars argue that “the highly advanced AN/TPY-2 radars can 
effectively cover the entire Chinese mainland,”54 other missile defense experts argue that in order 
to cover the entire or even a substantial portion of the Chinese mainland, such coverage would 
require the radar to operate at distances more than 4500 km, which is far beyond the capabilities 
of the THAAD radar.55 U.S. defense officials point out that the AN/TPY-2 radar operates at a 
much shorter effective radar range, depending on the quality of data needed, thereby arguing that 
the deployment of THAAD in South Korea was not intended to be a hostile act directed at China.56 
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Figure 6. China’s Nuclear and Missile Facilities 
 Source: “China Facilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 
 
 
More importantly, the controversy whether the technical specifications of THAAD’s radar 
can, and to what extent, monitor China does not seem to be the issue. Rather, the U.S.’s intention 
to deploy THAAD in South Korea and South Korea’s ultimate decision to deploy, despite the costs 
of significant economic retaliation by China and exacerbation of North Korean provocations, serve 
as a strong signal to China that South Korea values its alliance with the U.S. above all else, and 
cannot be relied on to hinder U.S. advances aimed at the broader policy of undermining China’s 
strategic security interests. 
China has never been persuaded by the U.S. and South Korea’s rhetoric that THAAD is 
solely directed to counter North Korean missiles. For years, China has strongly denounced South 
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Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD as a dangerous move that will threaten the peace and stability 
of the Asia-Pacific region and that “those who are fully aware of the matter can see through those 
technical excuses very easily.”57 There is also the real risk of an arms build-up in which China 
may respond by expanding its arsenal of nuclear-mounted missiles and greatly increase the risk of 
a nuclear war. Directly echoing security dilemma theories, China and Russia tend to argue that 
“even mild U.S. missile defense postures will, over time, accumulate increasing capabilities, and 
can therefore quickly convert such capability to a larger threatening posture in the region.”58  
Whether THAAD is primarily intended to be used as a defensive technology loses meaning 
in this context, as Chinese policymakers tend to believe that the offensive and the defensive are 
inseparable when a variable is introduced that disrupts strategic stability. A state’s defensive 
measure is potentially an offensive capability to an adversary, which is compelled to take its own 
defensive measure and will look potentially offensive to its adversary. As such, defensive 
technology can be a complement to offensive systems, both because it provokes the other part to 
amass offensive weapons, triggering an arms race, and also because defensive systems can 
diminish the effectiveness of a counterattack after aggression.  The dilemma is not limited to two 
states, but affects their allies, adversaries, and neighbors that are directed or indirectly affected by 
other state’s actions and reactions. This results in an ever increasing number of states embroiled 
in the security dilemma framework with exponential repercussions and mixed signaling. Such 
logic can be observed directly in China’s opposition to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea.  
China has responded by recommending certain countermeasures in an editorial in the Communist 
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Party newspaper Global Times, which included generally cutting off economic ties with South 
Korea and especially in key export areas, development of military technology to counter the threat 
posed by THAAD, such as creating technical disturbances and targeting missiles toward THAAD, 
and possible joint actions with Russia to counteract the security imbalance caused by deployment 
of THAAD.59 Thus, China considers the South Korean government’s decision to deploy THAAD 
as a hostile act by South Korea against China that unnecessarily increases the security dilemma in 
the region, which further questions the South Korean government’s action if it is indeed the case 
that the deployment of THAAD has essentially no real military or strategic benefit to South Korea. 
Considering that THAAD’s contribution to counter North Korea’s missile threats directed 
at South Korea is low, the costs are overwhelming. Not only has the deployment of THAAD 
resulted in significant economic retaliation from China and more frequent and significant 
provocations from North Korea, but it has also exacerbated China’s long-standing suspicion that 
the U.S. seeks to contain or encircle China by weakening China’s strategic deterrence, extract 
sensitive military information about China from neighboring allies and compromise China’s 
territorial sovereignty. From China’s perspective, the deployment of THAAD in South Korea and 
its radar capabilities not only signals South Korea’s intention to bolster their alliance with the U.S., 
but more importantly, exacerbates the security dilemma that is already prominent in the region. 
China’s Economic Retaliations against South Korea 
Considering that the deployment of THAAD had little military or strategic benefit to South 
Korea, the costs of deteriorating China-South Korea relations and China’s economic retaliations 
against South Korea were significantly more damaging. China is by far South Korea’s largest 
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export market, accounting for over 30% of exports in 2015.60 South Korea’s trade with China in 
2015 was at $302 billion, which was higher than South Korea’s combined trade with both the U.S. 
and Japan at approximately $234 billion.61 Such figure has increased more than 82% in the last 
five years. Chinese investors held 18%, or over $15 billion in government bonds and other publicly 
traded securities in South Korea, which is more than any other country.62 In 2015, South Korea 
was first among importers of Chinese goods and China’s fourth largest export market.63  
Chinese tourism in South Korea took the hardest hit as China’s National Tourism 
Administration reportedly issued instructions to reduce Chinese tourism in South Korea, ordered 
travel agencies to stop selling tour packages to South Korea and rejected several applications from 
Korean airlines to add charter flights between the two countries.64 The economic impact was 
significant – there was a 66% drop in Chinese tourists visiting South Korea in 2016, an effect that 
is compounded when considering that visitors from China accounted for 47% of all tourists and 
70% of sales at duty free shops in South Korea in 2016. China also started boycotting South Korean 
products in retaliation. Chinese sales of South Korean carmakers Hyundai and Kia dropped 52 
percent in 2016. China Central Television, a state-owned TV channel, banned the airing of South 
Korean TV shows, another popular cultural export, and suspended or cancelled several events 
featuring South Korean pop music (K-pop) and actors without any explanation. Several high-
profile cyberattacks from unidentified Chinese hackers targeted South Korean government, 
military, defense companies and large conglomerates. Notably, the South Korean conglomerate 
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Lotte Group, was directly threatened by the Chinese government when Lotte agreed to sell one of 
its golf courses to the South Korean government to be used as the THAAD deployment site. 
Chinese authorities responded by launching an investigation of Lotte’s operations in Shanghai, 
Beijing, Shenyang, and Chengdu and closed over 70% of Lotte’s facilities in mainland China citing 
safety violations.  
 China also appears to have used diplomatic levers to pressure South Korea. After the initial 
U.S.-South Korea joint statement to deploy THAAD was announced in February 7, 2016, China’s 
Ministry of National Defense suspended high-level defense dialogue with South Korea and 
postponed the South Korean defense minister’s visit to China.65 In addition, all official interactions 
between the South Korean and Chinese militaries, were reportedly frozen during the second half 
of 2016. China’s retaliatory actions against South Korea raised serious concerns as higher tariffs, 
nontariff barriers, tighter customs inspections and stricter rules on Korean products manufactured 
in China, tourism, economic sanctions, and general growing anti-Korean sentiment about South 
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CHAPTER 2 
CHANGES IN U.S. PRESSURES TO ADOPT AN INTEGRATED BALLISTIC  
MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND WITHDRAW MILITARY COMMITMENTS 
Ever since the Korean War in the 1950s, South Korea has maintained a strong alliance with 
the U.S., but the relationship has come under increasing strain in recent years. Increasing U.S. 
pressure for South Korea to adopt a U.S.-operated regionally integrated defense system and bear 
a growing share of the already disproportionate allocation of joint military expenditures have 
resulted in significant disagreements that threatened to unravel the alliance. The analysis 
demonstrates that continued U.S. pressure and resulting disagreements between the two countries 
have exacerbated the asymmetric nature of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and that the heightened 
fear of abandonment and threat of unravelling the already strained alliance was crucial in the South 
Korean government’s decision to deploy the first stages of THAAD as a temporary appeasement 
measure to improve relations with the U.S. 
Analysis of Alliances under the Realism Theoretical Framework 
The South Korean government’s decision to deploy THAAD was largely viewed under the 
realism framework of analysis. Its decision relied heavily on a cost-benefit analysis that weighed 
the benefits of preserving and maintaining the U.S.-South Korea military and security alliance 
against the costs of economic retaliation from China, exacerbated security dilemma with North 
Korea and domestic turmoil and public mistrust. An analysis of the factors that affect South 
Korea’s military and strategic alliance with the U.S. helps explain the South Korean government’s 
current assessment of the international and domestic political environment and its policy priorities 
and strategies to understand why it has taken certain actions at certain points in time and how it 
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views and manages its external relations and activities vis-à-vis other states. Realism provides a 
helpful theoretical framework to analyze how and why states maintain military alliances. 
Realism is an international relations theoretical framework in which states, as opposed to 
individuals or international organizations, are regarded as the central actors in international 
politics.67 States are viewed as operating in an anarchic international system lacking a governing 
authority, and that the only way to reduce conflict is to maintain a balance of power.68 As such, 
each state pursues its own strategic self-interests to increase its relative power and security in a 
largely self-help system, ultimately leading to perceived or actual conflict and making cooperation 
difficult. Realism predicts that each state, in its quest for accumulating power and resources, will 
strive to expand its territory and aggressively build up its military capabilities, which may lead to 
a security dilemma (spiral model) whereby actions taken to increase its own security may prompt 
other states to build up its own military in response, leading to an arms race that may result in even 
greater instability to the overall balance of power.69 Realist theories argue that this primary pursuit 
of self-interests make it difficult for states to cooperate, form relationships based on trust or adhere 
to a common set of rules, especially when those rules are directly opposed to the self-interests of 
the individual states.70  
States therefore have two principal means of providing security in an anarchic setting: 
balancing against others through domestic mobilization (self-help) or the formation of alliances. 
Alliances in particular provide some structure of cooperation and trust based on mutual benefit to 
each state’s interests and serve as a mechanism to maintain the overall balance of power by 
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deterring aggression from both allies and non-allies.71 An alliance relationship encompasses: 1) a 
strategic concept, or objective, that defines the shared obligations of alliance partners; 2) a common 
defense strategy through which roles, mission, and responsibilities are specified; 3) an agreement 
on the types and levels of forces required to implement a common defense strategy; and 4) a range 
of more-specialized agreements on command relations, base arrangements, and burden-sharing.72 
Central to the formation and maintenance of alliances between states are considerations 
about relative gains, leading to the distinction between symmetric or asymmetric alliances. An 
alliance structure, by its nature, constitutes of two or more actors that may not necessarily result 
in an equal balance of power or distribution of benefits. When viewed through the balance-of-
power logic, relative gain is dependent on how benefits will be distributed among participants and 
how the alliance will advantage its participants vis-à-vis common enemies.73 One of the most 
significant issues in maintaining an alliance is to adjust the ratio of benefits and costs under 
changing security environments. In particular, alliances require a critical choice between 
conflicting goals of security and autonomy. A symmetric alliance binds together states with similar 
interests. As such, the conflict between the benefits of augmented security and the costs of lessened 
autonomy is not likely to result in a difference in strategy or policy that would cause a serious 
conflict within such alliance.74 If such differences did emerge, the alliance would fail to provide 
the desired benefits and one nation would break the alliance before going to war. In contrast, the 
conflict between security and autonomy becomes a greater issue in asymmetric alliances, in which 
the different interests of states could lead to conflict among allies while preserving their overall 
                                                   
71 Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,”  
International Security 16, no.1 (1991): 117. 
72 J. D. Pollack and Y. K. Cha, A New Alliance: For the Next Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 11. 
73 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 51-53. 
74 J. D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,"  
American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 929. 
 32  
interest in the alliance.75 Asymmetric alliances also heightens a conflicting sense of abandonment 
and entrapment in the weaker party, which increases difference in interests and conflicts within 
the alliance.76 
The U.S.-South Korea alliance was clearly an asymmetric alliance from the outset. The 
U.S.-South Korea military alliance started, not as a relationship between two sovereign states, but 
as a process of state-formation and militarization between client and patron.77 The alliance was 
formed as a result of the Korean War when South Korea had limited sovereignty and the structure 
of the international system and balance of power after the end of the Second World War and 
throughout the Cold War heavily conditioned the environment of state-formation in South Korea.78  
Such asymmetric alliances were designed to provide the U.S. and its allies with security from 
common enemies, and in return, for the U.S. to exert some control over its allies’ policies and 
strategic locations to advance its interests and provide a basis for which to intervene on behalf of 
“friendly” governments.79 The South Korean government’s fear of being abandoned by the U.S. 
has always been a factor that heavily influences its military and strategic decisions and foreign 
policymaking. Whenever talks of reducing or withdrawing U.S. forces or military commitments 
from South Korea took place, the South Korean government would be alarmed and strongly 
support the position for continued U.S. security commitment over any conflicts or disagreements 
from being dominated in an asymmetric alliance. This dependent relationship has resulted in 
continuous U.S. pressure for South Korea to bear a disproportionate share of joint military 
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expenditures. Such U.S. pressure may take the form of direct pressure to adopt a costly 
technological defense system or indirect pressure involving the scaling down of various U.S. 
commitments, such as decreased joint military drills/exercises, reduced number of U.S. troops 
stationed in South Korean bases and decreased financial contributions for joint military purposes. 
When viewed in light of the asymmetric alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, South Korea’s 
response to continuous U.S. pressure to adopt a regionally integrated BMD architecture and bear 
a disproportionate share of joint military expenditures strongly supports the importance that the 
South Korean government places on maintaining the alliance at all costs, despite significant 
conflicts and disagreements. Thus, it was primarily the South Korean government’s fear that the 
U.S.-South Korea alliance would unravel that drove its decision to deploy the first stages of 
THAAD as a temporary appeasement measure in an effort to improve relations with the U.S. and 
mitigate the threat of abandonment.  
South Korea’s Consistent Resistance to Adopt an Integrated Missile Defense System 
Ever since the Korean War in the 1950s, South Korea has maintained a strong alliance with 
the U.S., but the relationship has come under increasing strain in recent years due to disagreements 
regarding the operations of USFK, failed attempt to transfer wartime operation control (OPCON) 
and related financial burden shifting more to South Korea.80 The U.S. has been pressuring South 
Korea for decades to deploy an anti-missile defense system like THAAD, bought from the U.S., 
which can be regionally integrated into an interoperable BMD architecture with promises to 
significantly improve security in the Korean peninsula.81 However, this has been one of the most 
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persistent disagreements in the U.S.-South Korea alliance long before the decision to deploy 
THAAD. 
The Security Benefits to South Korea 
South Korea has continuously resisted U.S. pressures to adopt an integrated BMD 
architecture. From the U.S.’s perspective, South Korea’s resistance to an integrated BMD system 
is unusual when compared to its experience with other allies in the Asia-Pacific region. An analysis 
of the South Korean defense establishment’s military strategy and foreign policy over the years 
demonstrate a consistent pattern of weighing the costs of adopting a U.S.-operated integrated BMD 
system relative to the perceived benefit to South Korean security. Moreover, South Korea has 
consistently preferred over the years to invest in offensive missile capabilities to intimidate North 
Korea with the threat of precision strikes, as opposed to defensive technology. Given this known 
and predictable position of the South Korean government, a question remains why it has decided 
to deploy THAAD, an expensive defensive technology operated by U.S. military forces, when the 
cost-benefit calculus to South Korean security was uncertain at best.   
Previous interactions between South Korean defense ministers and the USFK clearly 
demonstrates South Korea’s long-standing policy to not simply cave under U.S. pressure when 
certain military policies and decisions were of little benefit to itself. In 1993, then U.S. 
Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch requested South Korea to participate in a regional BMD 
system and urged to procure the Patriot missile defense for a price of $600 million for seven 
batteries.82 South Korea decided against the purchase, citing that the cost of provoking North 
Korea and antagonizing China outweighed the security benefits to South Korea awarded from 
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deploying the Patriot.83 During the same year, USFK independently a Patriot Advanced Capability 
(PAC)-2 batteries at Busan, South Korea, but the South Korean government publicly clarified that 
the deployment of PAC-2 was an independent decision by USFK for its own defense and not a 
change in policy for its own missile defense strategy.84 In 1999, in the face of growing threat of 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung made it 
clear that “South Korea will not join the BMD system on the grounds that it would provide little 
benefit to the defense of South Korea and that it will focus on independently-produced missile 
interceptors such as the L-SAM, which costs $10 million, that is approximately 100 times cheaper 
than a PAC-3 or other state-of-the-art BMD system as part of the U.S. integrated network which 
is estimated to cost South Korea approximately $1 billion”85 Again in 2001, South Korean Defense 
Minister Cho Sung-Tae, pointing to the high costs and questions regarding the feasibility of its 
implementation, expressed South Korea’s unwillingness to participate in the U.S. BMD system 
and strongly asserted that South Korea needs to “build its own missile system that fits our 
circumstances.”86 Even in 2013 and 2014 when South Korean officials were in discussion with the 
U.S. regarding the deployment of THAAD, former Minister of National Defense Kim Kwan-jin 
continued to insist that even though the deployment of THAAD had the potential to enhance anti-
ballistic missile capabilities for the USFK, the regional BMD system that the U.S. wants South 
Korea to join” is primarily aimed at defending the continental U.S. and our Korea Air and Missile 
Defense (KAMD) will continue to protect South Korea” and clarified that “South Korea has not 
make any decision to procure nor even consider the acquisition of THAAD at this point.”87 
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South Korea’s Desire for Military and Strategic Autonomy 
The desire for military and strategic autonomy is another prominent reason underpinning 
South Korea’s continued resistance against U.S. pressure to adopt an integrated BMD system. 
Rather than rely passively on U.S. protection against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, 
South Korea has remained committed to develop and enhance its own national KAMD system. In 
addition, despite the long presence of U.S. troops on South Korean soil, South Korea retains a 
remarkable desire to establish greater independence from its patron-ally, as evidenced by its 
repeated commitment to transfer wartime OPCON, which is explained further below.88 South 
Korea’s goal to achieve greater self-reliance in military defense was best captured by Defense 
Minister Chun’s remarks stating that “always being in need of superior foreign technology for 
national defense would mean that South Korea would never be able to choose its own course.”89 
Another aspect of Korean nationalism, in the form of anti-Japanese sentiment, also helps to explain 
South Korea’s desire to develop and maintain an independent BMD system. The U.S. BMD 
architecture in the Asia-Pacific region is integrated with Japan’s BMD system, which is the same 
system that the U.S. has been pressuring South Korea to join. However, even the mutually 
beneficial decision to share military-sensitive data between South Korea and the U.S. could 
contribute indirectly to the defense of Japan, whose intentions South Korea considers as suspect. 
Serious obstacles to trilateral defense cooperation remain, as clearly demonstrated as recently as 
April 2011 when South Korea decided not to sign the General Security of Military Information 
Agreement with Japan to permit the sharing of sensitive defense data.90 
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Failure to Transfer OPCON and Increasing Strain on the U.S.-South Korea Alliance 
Despite the South Korean government’s consistent policy position to prioritize the benefits 
to South Korean security and rely on the development of its own national defense system to retain 
control over its military, its calculus shifted when a number of disagreements with the U.S. on 
other joint military subjects threatened to unravel the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Starting in 2013, 
heightened disagreements with the U.S. due to the issue of OPCON transfer made South Korean 
Ministry of Defense and senior military officials nervous about increasing strains on the alliance, 
prompting them to rethink their previous strongly held position that South Korea will not consider 
the deployment of THAAD.91 OPCON transfer is a highly politicized issue in South Korea, which 
implicates questions of sovereignty as South Korea continues to lack complete control over its 
own military. The current structure was put in place since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, 
when operational control of the South Korean armed forces was handed over to the U.S. While 
peacetime OPCON was transferred back to South Korea in 1994, wartime OPCON remains under 
a combined U.S. and South Korean armed forces led by a U.S. Army four-star general. This means 
that in the event South Korea is attacked, the current structure will require South Korea to supply 
the overwhelming majority of the fighting force but the U.S. will have full operational control of 
South Korea’s military.  
While the current OPCON structure undoubtedly forms an essential part of the U.S.-South 
Korea military alliance, it is also a structure that makes both sides uncomfortable. While both 
countries are divided on the issue, the U.S.’s official policy is to press for OPCON transfer to 
lessen control and withdraw more U.S. troops from South Korea. South Korea also wants more 
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freedom to act, especially in formulating its own deterrence policies against North Korea’s 
provocations, but fears that the U.S.-South Korea alliance will be adversely affected and it would 
be abandoned once OPCON transfer is completed. There is also a possibility that the U.S.’s 
withdrawal will invite more provocations from North Korea or unwanted influence from China 
and questions whether South Korea’s defense capabilities are ready to address such advances. 
After a few attempts to postpone OPCON transition, the South Korea Defense Ministry once again 
decided to delay the transfer in October 2013, citing increased tensions on the peninsula from 
North Korea’s continued nuclear provocations.  
Around the time the decision to delay OPCON transfer was announced, there was a notable 
shift in the South Korean government’s position towards the deployment of THAAD. On October 
17, 2013, South Korea’s Defense Ministry requested the Pentagon to provide information 
regarding costs and capabilities of THAAD as a defense against North Korean ballistic missiles.  
Despite Defense Ministry officials stating that they are requesting information with the intention 
of researching systems for domestic technology development rather than for purchase, South 
Korean officials did, however, state that U.S. deployment of THAAD would most likely help 
counter North Korean missile threats. The South Korean Defense Minister has notably stated that 
the range of defense provided by THAAD will enormously contribute to enhancing South Korea’s 
security and the defense of the USFK.”92 In 2014, General Curtis Scaparrotti, then-commander of 
USFK, proposed that South Korea accept the deployment of THAAD on South Korean soil to 
enhance joint security.93 In May 2014, the Pentagon revealed that it was studying possible sites to 
base THAAD batteries in South Korea.  
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South Korea’s shift in policy may be partially explained by the U.S.’s assessment of the 
U.S.-South Korea alliance after postponement of OPCON transfer. At the forum hosted by the 
Korea Institute of Defense Analysis in June 2014, General Scaparrotti disclosed that South Korea’s 
previous resistance to the deployment of THAAD had created intense debate with negative 
repercussions for the U.S.-South Korea alliance.94 If South Korea resisted the deployment despite 
recent re-postponement of OPCON transfer, there was a significant likelihood that it would 
heighten mistrust and be viewed as uncooperative, further straining relations with the U.S. In 
addition, if the South Korean government rejected the deployment, which would protect the USFK 
against nuclear and missile attacks from North Korea, it could raise serious skepticism as to why 
the U.S. should keep unprotected troops in South Korea.95 Thus, despite the U.S. and South 
Korea’s arguments in favor of deploying THAAD being primarily focused on its strategic benefits 
of ensuring security of South Korea and USFK against North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
provocations, an analysis of the events leading up to South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD 
demonstrates that the South Korean government’s notable policy shift, which occurred around the 
time the decision to postpone OPCON transfer was made, was more of a response to appease the 
U.S. and minimize any further strain on the U.S.-South Korea alliance.  
Disagreements Over Shared Burden of Military and Financial Commitments 
Another aspect of increasing U.S. pressure may be indirect in the form of scaling down 
various U.S. military and financial commitments, such as joint military drills/exercises, number of 
U.S. troops stationed in South Korean and financial contributions for joint military purposes. At 
the end of the Korean War, the U.S. and South Korea signed a treaty of mutual defense, which 
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provided the basis for U.S. armed forces stationing in South Korea. In 1966, the two countries 
signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which designated that the U.S. will bear all costs 
for U.S. troops’ maintenance, except those to be borne by South Korea, which included furnishing 
and compensating for “all facilities and areas and rights of way”.96 The positions of the two states 
remain quite different in terms of cost allocation – the U.S. has been increasing pressure on South 
Korea to bear even more of a disproportionate share of joint military expenditures, while South 
Korea seeks to retain the current framework. Despite these differences, South Korea’s position is 
that “the two countries continue close consultations to minimize the absence of an agreement and 
contribute to the U.S.-South Korea alliance.”97 
The U.S. currently has approximately 174,000 active-duty personnel deployed to overseas 
locations in approximately 140 countries.98  For fiscal year 2020, the Department of Defense 
Comptroller’s Office estimates the total cost of overseas bases and deployments to cost $24 billion, 
with the total cost of maintaining U.S. presence in South Korea to be $4.5 billion.99 The U.S. 
currently maintains 28,500 troops in South Korea, a number that has been steadily decreasing from 
325,000 at the height of the Korean War, but which has not significantly decreased in the last ten 
years.100 The U.S. had plans to scale back joint military exercises with the South Korean military, 
there were no significant changes to the number of joint military exercises around the time the 
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decision was made to deploy THAAD.101 Rather, the intensity, and expenditure, of joint military 
exercises increased after the deployment of THAAD when it was publicly announced that annual 
military drills between the U.S. and South Korea, which would be the largest in scale since 2010, 
would go ahead as scheduled despite North Korea’s repeated warnings.102 
Moreover, South Korea continues to share a disproportionate burden of military 
expenditures for joint security purposes. To determine the extent of South Korea’s financial 
contributions, the two countries have signed several Special Measures Agreements (SMA) that 
cover multiple years. Figure 7 shows that the financial costs allocated to South Korea in order to 
maintain USFK operations on its soil is already staggering. 103  In 2017, South Korea was 
responsible for 50% to 72% of the costs of stationing U.S. forces in its various bases in South 
Korea, and as high as 92% of the costs of operating Camp Humphreys, which is one of the largest 
U.S. military installations abroad. Under the last SMA, reached in February 2019 for one year, 
South Korea agreed to increase its contribution from $800 million to $1 billion, which was lowered 
from the Trump administration’s demands to contribute $1.6 billion.104 
The deployment of THAAD will further increase the disagreement over allocating the 
financial burden of joint military costs between South Korea and the USFK. The value of foreign 
military sales purchased from the U.S. in 2017 had already cost South Korea over $26 billion. The 
first THAAD battery deployed in South Korea cost around $1.3 billion and full deployment, 
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including maintenance and upgrades, is estimated to cost over $10 billion.105 Recently, President 
Trump has aggressively demanded on repeated occasions that South Korea should pay for the 
deployment of THAAD. 106 For the first THAAD battery, the Pentagon honored SOFA and the 
existing SMA in place to cover its cost of deployment, operation and maintenance, while South 
Korea paid for site maintenance and infrastructure costs. Defense Minister Han Min-goo has 
reiterated that “the operating cost of THAAD is covered by the two governments’ defense cost-
sharing agreement, so South Korea will bear no additional cost except for providing the site.”107 
However, pressure has increased for South Korea to pay its future share of defense expenses for 
additional THAAD batteries, either directly or indirectly by paying a larger portion of USFK 
stationing costs.108 
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Figure 7. What South Korea Pays to Maintain U.S. Military Presence  
Source: Lee and Botto. “President Moon Jae-in and the Politics of Inter-Korean Détente,” Carnegie Endowment for  
International Peace, Korea Strategic Review 2018. Data from Defense News, Yonhap News Agency, The Wall Street  
Journal, Stars and Stripes, and United States Forces Commander General Brooks’ 2017 and 2018 congressional  
testimony. 
 
Thus, despite the potential security benefits of having a regionally integrated and 
interoperable BMD system to exchange sensitive military data and coordinate actions in combat, 
South Korea’s desire for autonomy and control over its own military and mounting costs to pay 
for U.S. military forces in South Korea appears to have been a source of significant disagreement 
that strains the U.S.-South Korean alliance. The South Korean government’s consistent position 
that prioritizes benefits to South Korean security and its reliance on the development of its own 
national defense system to retain control over its military explains its initial resistance to deploying 
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THAAD. However, the fear of abandonment and threat of unravelling the already strained U.S.-
South Korea alliance, especially heightened after the repeated failure to transfer OPCON, 
significantly changed the South Korean government’s calculus that led to its decision to deploy 
the first stages of THAAD as a temporary appeasement measure to improve relations with the U.S. 
Once U.S.-South Korea relations have improved, we would expect that South Korea would revert 
to its prior policy position, thereby resisting pressure to complete the deployment of a U.S.-
operated, regionally integrated BMD system, especially when the benefits to South Korea’s 
security do not justify its costs. Such action was demonstrated by the Moon administration’s 
decision to suspend any additional stages of deployment once the urgency of repairing the U.S.-
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CHAPTER 3 
POLICY CHANGE AND THE TWO ADMINISTRATIONS’ RESPONSE 
Not only did the deployment of THAAD have national and international security 
implications, but the controversy surrounding its security benefits to South Korea further 
exacerbated the public’s mistrust of the government that was already in tethers from President 
Park’s political scandal involving charges of extortion, fraud and unethical use of executive 
privilege, which eventually led to her impeachment. Due to domestic opposition from the public 
and various civil society groups, the decision to deploy THAAD was not an easy task for any 
administration. 109  After the impeachment, President Park’s decision to deploy THAAD was 
reversed by her successor, President Moon, who has currently suspended the deployment of 
additional stages of THAAD. Thus, it is necessary to analyze both the domestic and international 
factors that may have led to this policy change and how such decisions interact with the South 
Korean government’s focus on maintaining the U.S.-South Korea alliance, especially when 
disagreements over sharing of military expenditures and the fear of abandonment have arguably 
increased by actions taken by the Trump administration. The analysis demonstrates that while both 
administrations were preoccupied with preserving and maintaining the U.S.-South Korea alliance, 
they had significantly different policy approaches to improving relations with the U.S. and 
lessening threats from North Korea, which accounted for the reversal of policy with regards to the 
deployment of THAAD. 
Park Administration’s Focus on Improving Relations through Military Cooperation	
A critical component of analyzing a state’s foreign policymaking is its decision-making 
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process. Foreign policy decision-making is largely impacted by the political context in which the 
decision is made, which includes the decision-maker’s strategic consideration of both international 
and domestic imperatives. The head of state in any political system requires consensus-building to 
formulate policies of any kind and retain political power, and thus, the existing domestic structure, 
political institutions and policy coalitions significantly influence the state’s involvement and 
understanding of international affairs. An analysis of the factors that affect the state’s decision-
making process explains its current assessment of the international and domestic political 
environment and its policy priorities and strategies to understand why state decision-making 
bodies have taken certain actions at certain points in time and how such state views and manages 
its external relations and activities vis-à-vis other states, international organizations, and non-state 
actors.110  
The Park administration, in line with previous policy positions of the conservative Saenuri 
Party (now the Liberty Korea Party), concentrated on improving relations with the U.S., especially 
focusing on the importance of continued military and security cooperation and strengthening the 
U.S.-South Korea alliance.111  In contrast, the Park administration paid less attention to improving 
relations with China and North Korea. Before the 2012 presidential election, President Park’s 
position on North Korea was to initiate an era of “Trustpolitik” centered on building trust with 
North Korea. However, relations with North Korea deteriorated to an all-time low during her time 
in office. President Park closed down the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which for cultural more 
than economic reasons, symbolized the most extensive attempt at fostering economic cooperation 
between the two Koreas. The Park administration was adamantly opposed to transferring OPCON 
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when relations with the U.S. was already strained and encouraged the deployment of THAAD as 
to signal South Korea’s continued investment and willingness to cooperate with the U.S. to 
enhance mutual security. Similarly, the current joint military exercises between the U.S. and South 
Korea were larger and more expensive than ever under the Park administration, with two massive 
land exercises that were designed to combine field training of ground, air, naval and special 
operations forces with the intent of simulating a full-scale war scenario that assumes the 
deployment and readiness of THAAD. While there were no direct North Korean attacks on South 
Korea comparable to the 2010 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, President Park was quick to 
seize the opportunity to escalate North-South tensions when North Korea launched another long-
range nuclear missile signaling its opposition to increasing U.S. sanctions. All countries tend to 
utilize foreign threat – real, imagined, or exaggerated – to divert attention away from domestic 
problems, and President Park was no exception in using the “North Wind” – the perceived threat 
from North Korea – both for electoral advantage and to divert attention away from domestic issues, 
including her impeachment.   
Under pressure to improve relations with the U.S. and worried about the imminent prospect 
of the liberal presidential candidate Moon Jae-in winning the May 2017 election, Prime Minister 
Hwang from the conservative Saenuri Party moved swiftly to install the partial deployment of 
THAAD through an undemocratic and opaque decision-making process without consulting the 
national assembly. On March 6, 2017 two THAAD launcher trucks arrived by air transport at Osan 
Air Base in South Korea. 112  Earlier that day, North Korea had launched four missiles to 
demonstrate its opposition against the deployment. The controversy and speculation surrounding 
the capabilities of THAAD and the security benefits to South Korea had only increased since the 
                                                   
112 Missile Defense Project, "Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),"  
https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/thaad/. 
 48  
decision to deploy, notably that a North Korean missile barrage would still pose a threat to South 
Korea and that the THAAD defense system will not add much to the layered defense provided by 
Patriot and Aegis systems that South Korea already possesses. On May 2, 2017, the South Korean 
Defense Ministry and the U.S. military announced that the THAAD system in Seongju is 
operational and “has the ability to intercept North Korean missiles and defend South Korea.”113  It 
was reported that the system will not reach its full operational potential until the end of 2017 when 
additional elements of the system are onsite.  
Moon Administration’s Suspension of Additional Deployment 
After President Park was impeached, the incoming President Moon of the liberal 
Democracy Party was thrust into a challenging political environment where there was a heightened 
focus on repairing and reinstituting democratic politics and transparent policymaking. Upon 
assuming office, he was immediately confronted with the difficult decision on whether to 
dismantle the current THAAD framework that his predecessor has put in place. Reversal of policy 
would risk deteriorating the U.S.-Korea alliance again, but allowing it to proceed and become 
operational would heighten China and North Korea’s security dilemma and mutual distrust for 
years to come. In June 2017, the Moon administration decided to suspend continued deployment 
of additional stages of THAAD, citing “procedural legitimacy” issues in the manner of deployment 
by its predecessor and environmental and public safety issues.114 Moon was careful not to tie the 
suspension of deployment to any signal that South Korea was not committed to its alliance with 
the U.S., emphasizing that he did not intend to completely reverse the deployment but that the 
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process would have to undergo a comprehensive review due to domestic concerns.115  
This change in policy in the Moon administration is largely explained by significant 
differences in its character and policy priorities when compared to the Park administration. Most 
notably, the Moon administration was quick to turn the attention away from enhancing military 
and security cooperation but focusing on peace talks and finding areas of shared interest, such as 
economic cooperation, as well as broadening its focus to improving relations with North Korea 
and China in addition to the U.S.  Before assuming office, Moon Jae-in had strongly criticized the 
deployment plan as a unilateral decision of the Park administration and has called for a review, 
emphasizing strong opposition by China and North Korea.116  President Moon has highlighted the 
ineffectiveness of applying sanctions on North Korea to stop its nuclear weapons program and 
reiterated that the goal of sanctions should be to draw North Korea back to the negotiating table.117 
Once the initial stages of THAAD were deployed in order to temporary appease the U.S. and 
improve relations, the Moon administration decided to change course to focus on repairing 
relations with China and North Korea using open constructive dialogue and emphasizing possible 
areas of cooperation to work towards a common goal and shared interest.  
Beginning in 2018, the Moon administration announced its strategy of focusing more on 
engaging in peace talks with North Korea and normalizing trade relations with China. In particular, 
President Moon was successful in turning the country’s attention away from THAAD and taking 
a hard-line military stance. His policy of pursuing an amicable solution with North Korea came to 
fruition when he successfully negotiated for a series of inter-Korea summits held in April, May 
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and September 2018, the first time that North Korea’s highest ranking leader had stepped foot in 
South Korea, and jointly adopted the Panmunjom Declaration in which North and South Korea 
agreed to actively seek the support and cooperation of the international community for the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, although criticized for not having any defined timelines 
or plans to take concrete steps.118 The inter-Korea summits were followed by two U.S.-North 
Korea summits held in Singapore in June 2018 and Hanoi in February 2019, respectively.   
Although denuclearization talks became stalled after the Hanoi talks broke down and North 
Korea signaled its frustration by firing several short-range projectiles in May 2019,119  the Moon 
administration remained firm in its decision not to push forward on its progress let alone full 
deployment of THAAD. Rather, the South Korean government turned to a more familiar course 
of action to show North Korea and the world that its alliance with the U.S. remains strong: the 
joint U.S.-Korea military exercises. Days before South Korea was scheduled to conduct the joint 
military drills, North Korea launched two more short-range ballistic missiles into the sea between 
the Korean peninsula and Japan, citing that the provocations were directly in opposition to the joint 
military drills. North Korea’s reaction to South Korea resuming joint military exercises was 
consistent with past years and largely anticipated. South Korea had chosen to resume the less 
controversial joint military exercises in lieu of pressing onward with the full deployment of 
THAAD, a deliberate choice based on its analysis that would strengthen the continued military 
and security alliance with the U.S. while drawing less hostility from North Korea and from China. 
A comparison of the policy priorities and focus of the two administrations demonstrate that 
both placed heightened importance on maintaining the U.S.-South Korea alliance but its policy 
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approaches were significantly different. While the Park administration focused on strengthening 
military and security cooperation as its overarching strategy to prevent further deterioration of the 
alliance and mitigate fear of abandonment, the Moon administration focused on opening 
constructive dialogue and highlighting areas of shared interest with the U.S., China and North 
Korea, thereby turning attention away from completing the deployment of THAAD after the 
urgency of repairing the U.S.-South Korea alliance had subsided and especially when the benefits 
to South Korea’s security did not justify its costs.  
The Effects of Domestic Public Opinion on Foreign Policy 
 Another important factor that influenced the difference in policy approaches between the 
Park and Moon administrations was the public mistrust of the South Korean government during 
the time that THAAD was deployed, as distinguished from public opinion against the deployment 
of THAAD itself. The exact role and level of influence of public opinion in foreign policy has 
been a topic of persistent debate.120 Public opinion may fall short of resulting in actual policy 
changes, as demonstrated by the failure of public opposition to prevent the Park administration 
from deploying the first stages of THAAD. However, public opinion is a crucial factor that affects 
the political context and strategic consideration of decision-makers and their analysis of the costs 
and benefits of certain policies to pursue over others. Obtaining a requisite level of domestic 
acceptability or public mandate on foreign policy can provide much needed political capital and 
legitimacy, thus heightening the decision-maker’s capability to act effectively. The role of public 
opinion in foreign policy emphasizes that accountability to the public plays a constructive role in 
constraining the war-making proclivities of policymakers.121 In contrast, realists are skeptical that 
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the public would be sufficiently informed to make rational decisions on such complex and remote 
issues that may not directly affect their daily lives.122 While accountability to the public is an 
essential tenet of liberal democracy, realists caution that foreign policy, especially in national 
security contexts, require secrecy, flexibility and a need to make rapid decisions within a pressured 
timeframe, which would be seriously jeopardized if public opinion were to have a significant 
impact on foreign policy. Public opinion is viewed as highly volatile, easily swayed by emotion, 
and significantly influenced by misperception, especially from misinformation through the 
media.123 The volatile nature of public opinion, in addition to the lack of effective means by the 
state to gather and process legitimate data on public opinion, is a significant deterrent in 
incorporating public opinion to coherent and effective policymaking.124 There is also the added 
complexity on what is considered the public’s opinion, in that the opinions of groups with 
disproportionate political power and authority will be more likely to be considered. However, with 
the decline in major power confrontations and increased globalization that characterize the current 
international system and greater focus on issues that are resolved over a longer time period, there 
are arguably more opportunities for public opinion to influence foreign policy.125  
The Public’s Growing Mistrust of the Park Administration 
Given North Korea’s ongoing missile tests and its threats against both the U.S. and South 
Korea, common sense might seem to dictate that South Korean citizens would welcome THAAD 
as a defensive technology providing protection against a possible North Korean attack.  However, 
the Park administration’s decision to deploy THAAD came at a time when President Park was 
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embroiled in the midst of a series of political scandals that deteriorated public trust of the 
government to unprecedented levels, which eventually led to her impeachment. 
 
 
Figure 8. Reasons for Opposing THAAD (%) 
Source: “Asan special survey,” Research & Research,	November 22-24, 2016. 
 
 
Figure 8 demonstrates the results of public opinion surveys on THAAD around the time 
the South Korean government announced its decision to deploy.126 The survey shows that the 
majority of the public, approximately 54%, opposed the deployment of THAAD because it could 
not trust the government, as opposed to reasons specific to the THAAD system itself, such as 
potential health and environmental issues, which only comprised approximately 8%. Another 23% 
cited concerns about deteriorating China-South Korea relations as the reason for opposition.127 
Similarly, Figure 9 shows that between February 2016 and November 2016, public approval 
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ratings for the deployment of THAAD decreased from 73.9% to 46.3%.128 The most common 
reasons were based on criticism over insufficient attention being paid to public sentiment and the 
government’s unresponsiveness to public concern for a full-scale investigation into the 
environmental and safety issues created by THAAD.129  
 
Figure 9. Public Opinion on THAAD (%) 
Source: “Asan special survey,” Research & Research, March 18-20, 2015; February 10-12, 2016; August 16-18, 
2016; September 21-23, 2016; November 22-24, 2016; Jung-Yeop Woo. “Korean Public’s Perception of THAAD,” 
2016 Korean Political Science Association. 
 
 
The public opinion against President Park’s decision to deploy THAAD was mainly due to 
the undemocratic and opaque decision-making process in which the Park administration handled 
the negotiations for deployment, not a direct opposition against the THAAD system itself. At the 
heart of the anti-THAAD movement in South Korea is the recognition that the South Korean 
government has handled the decision-making process of the deployment in an illegal and 
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undemocratic way, yielding to U.S. pressure and demands rather than protecting the safety of 
South Korean citizens. President Park’s decision came under fire from various South Korean 
citizen groups, in part, because the national assembly was not consulted on the matter before the 
agreement was finalized, and no public documents were released that provided information about 
either the decision-making process or the terms of the agreement. Activists and civil society groups 
widely denounced that the U.S. has pressured South Korea to agree to the deployment of THAAD 
as part of its broader regional objective, the encirclement and containment of China and to further 
U.S. military imperialism in the Asia-Pacific region. This was quickly escalated into a critique of 
the way in which U.S.-South Korea relations, in the name of maintaining strategic alliance, has 
subjected South Korean democracy. The lack of transparency and democratic procedural 
protections around the decision to deploy raised serious red flags given that President Park and 
some of her closest associates were allegedly involved in various corruption-related crimes 
committed during her time in office.  
Lack of Response to Address Public Concerns of Growing Environmental and Safety Issues 
Another consideration that heightened public antagonism and mistrust was the Park 
administration’s lack of response to address the public’s concern about potential health and 
environmental impacts of THAAD. Again, the public opposition was not against the THAAD 
system itself due to potentially negative health and environmental impact, but the government’s 
lack of response to address such concern. When the U.S. Department of Defense and South Korean 
Ministry of National Defense announced that Seongju was selected as the site of deployment, the 
decision was quickly met with protests from Seongju County residents, who feared that radiation 
emitted by the AN/TPY-2 radar would be harmful to their health and to the environment. 
Specifically, the debate involved the extent to which exposure to electric and magnetic fields of 
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high frequencies emitted by THAAD’s radar, which, if exceeding a certain threshold, would lead 
to body-heat stress and excessive local tissue heating.130 The U.S. argued that other countries that 
deployed THAAD have not reported any environment problems specific to the deployment and 
operation of THAAD, but the U.S. THAAD base in Guam was located further away from the 
nearest residential area than South Korea’s THAAD base from Seongju.131 The public demanded 
that a formal and comprehensive environmental assessment should be undertaken before 
deployment. However, there was no concrete action undertaken by the Park administration to 
alleviate or respond to such public concern. A strong anti-THAAD movement was growing, 
spearheaded by Kim Hang-kohn, the Seongju County Chief who, while being part of the same 
conservative party of President Park, went against party lines and rallied thousands of local 
residents to oppose the decision to deploy THAAD in Seongju.  While the anti-THAAD movement 
was largely driven by residents of Seongju and the surrounding area, it was supported by networks 
of activists from all over the country, many affiliated with strong religious groups, peacebuilding, 
labor and social justice organizations that have historically been able to mobilize large groups of 
the public for events such as emergency blockades or large-scale demonstrations characteristic of 
South Korea’s “candlelight” democratic protests. When the anti-THAAD movement began 
gaining strength in the second half of 2016, it was galvanized by the broader political transition 
that rattled the country and contributed significant momentum to the impeachment of President 
Park in December 2016.  
In May 2017, President Moon assumed office with a record high approval rating and a 
clear and powerful mandate from the Candlelight movement to institute domestic reform and social 
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progress based on openness, transparency and democratic justice.132  There was considerable 
pressure on the new administration to differentiate itself from its impeached predecessor, 
especially by reinstituting democratic procedural legitimacy and participatory review mechanisms 
in order to regain public trust and support. Upon assuming office, President Moon had discovered 
that four additional THAAD launchers was sold to South Korea without the Defense Ministry 
informing him.133 Given the heightened sensitivity to undemocratic and opaque decision-making 
processes that resulted in President Park’s impeachment, President Moon officially suspended 
further progress on the full deployment of THAAD citing the problem of “procedural legitimacy.” 
Further deployment was postponed pending a full environmental inspection to be conducted in 
order to alleviate the public’s concern for health and safety.134 The full deployment of THAAD 
remains stalled to this day.  
The significant negative public opinion and mistrust against the government was not 
enough to restrain President Park from deploying the first stages of THAAD at the end of her time 
in office. However, public opinion had a profound effect on the election of President Moon and 
the political capital and mandate endowed on his administration, which was centered on 
democratic procedural legitimacy. Once the initial stages of THAAD were deployed in order to 
temporarily appease and improve relations with the U.S., the Moon administration decided it 
would cost too much political capital to allow the continued deployment of THAAD in the absence 
of procedural legitimacy or risk losing his mandate at the beginning of his administration. Thus, 
public opinion strongly influenced the policies that the Moon administration decided to use in 
order to repair relations with the U.S., China and North Korea. Such differences in the political 
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context in which the decision is made, which includes the decision-maker’s strategic consideration 
and assessment of both international and domestic imperatives, demonstrate that while both 
administrations were preoccupied with preserving and maintaining the U.S.-South Korea alliance, 
they had significantly different policy approaches to improving relations with the U.S. and 
lessening threats from North Korea, which accounted for the reversal of policy with regards to the 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary 
The rapidly changing international security relations in the Asia-Pacific have put an 
increasing strain on the seemingly unwavering 70-year old alliance between the U.S. and South 
Korea, often quoted as the “lynchpin”135  of security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. 
However, the alliance was never a simple, one-dimensional relationship that could be analyzed by 
focusing on any single country, motive or point in time. In fact, the multifaceted nature of the U.S.-
South Korea alliance has taken on a new meaning in the recent THAAD debate. The South Korean 
government’s decision to deploy U.S.-operated THAAD technology in July 2016 signaled that a 
militarily less significant but politically and symbolically potent weapon system would be 
introduced into South Korea at a time of rapidly increasing tension in the Asia-Pacific region. Both 
governments stated that the primary reason for deployment was to enhance the security of South 
Korea, the U.S. and allies in the Asia Pacific region against North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
provocations. However, an analysis of the technological capabilities of THAAD demonstrated that 
it is largely ineffective to enhance the security of South Korea against a nuclear or missile attack 
from North Korea. Rather than focusing on the policy recommendations or implications of 
deployment, this thesis analyzed the factors that ultimately led the South Korean government’s 
decision to deploy the first stages of THAAD and its subsequent decision to suspend the 
deployment of additional stages at the time and in the manner that it did. The analysis demonstrates 
that the South Korean government’s decision that gave primacy to maintaining its military and 
strategic alliance with the U.S., despite weak evidence of THAAD’s benefits to enhance South 
Korean security, indicates that the decision to deploy the first stages of THAAD was a temporary 
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appeasement measure to prevent the U.S.-South Korea alliance from unraveling. The decision to 
deploy closely tracked the changes in direct or indirect U.S. pressure to adopt an integrated 
defensive system to counteract threats by North Korea rather than any significant change in 
patterns of North Korean nuclear and missile provocation. Once the initial stages were deployed 
and the urgency of repairing the alliance subsided, continued deployment proved to be too much 
to withstand the costs of economic retaliation from China, exacerbated security dilemma with 
North Korea and further domestic turmoil and public mistrust, thus leading the Moon 
administration to suspend further deployment. The decision to deploy THAAD serves as an 
effective framework that allows for an analysis of the complicated motives, perceptions and 
decision-making structures of the multiple international players involved. 
Limitations 
This analysis examines potential factors that significantly affected the South Korean 
government’s policy position from initial resistance to ultimate deployment of THAAD. While no 
significant changes were observed in patterns of North Korean nuclear and military provocations 
leading up to and after the decision to deploy the first stage of THAAD in July 2016, this does not 
rule out the possibility that an increase in North Korean provocations would have affected the 
South Korean government’s decision if significant changes in provocations were present. In order 
to further such inquiry, an analysis is required to examine situations in which changes in North 
Korean provocations have led to changes in policy and decision-making processes of the South 
Korean government and its defense establishment. Such analysis will be constructive in order to 
better understand the strategic considerations involved in the deployment of THAAD as well as 
any future deployments or acceptance of other U.S.-operated military technology. 
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Further Questions 
While the additional stages of THAAD deployment have currently been suspended, it 
remains to be seen whether the deployment will proceed as originally planned at a later time, 
especially since the inertia of deploying the first stages has been overcome. Once public opposition 
subsides and trust of the government improves, the South Korean government may decide to 
complete the full deployment to harness the full capacity of THAAD’s defense technology. 
Nevertheless, with all things considered equal, if the South Korean government’s decision to 
deploy the first stages of THAAD was primarily influenced by its need to repair relations with the 
U.S. and maintain the current U.S.-South Korea alliance, one would expect that there would not 
be a significant push to proceed with deploying the rest of the THAAD technology unless the 
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